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Cheap Talk Stabilizes Strategic Interaction in LLM Agents

来源:arXiv cs.MA 论文速递 约 2256 字 llmmulti-agentrsi
arXiv cs.MA
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01核心要点

  • Large language models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents, making the persistence of their action policies across repeated interaction critical for reliable multi-agent operation.
  • We investigate whether and how agent-generated, non-binding pre-play communication ("cheap talk") increases such persistence in four open-weight 7-9B-parameter LLMs.
  • Our experiments span four repeated two-player games -- Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift, Stag Hunt, and Harmony -- with incentive structures ranging from strategic conflict to alignment, each presented in six contexts.

02正文全文

Abstract:Large language models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents, making the persistence of their action policies across repeated interaction critical for reliable multi-agent operation. We investigate whether and how agent-generated, non-binding pre-play communication ("cheap talk") increases such persistence in four open-weight 7-9B-parameter LLMs. Our experiments span four repeated two-player games -- Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift, Stag Hunt, and Harmony -- with incentive structures ranging from strategic conflict to alignment, each presented in six contexts. We observe unstable trajectories in all four games, although their prevalence and magnitude depend strongly on model and context. Across models, games, and contexts, cheap talk is predominantly stabilizing, with five corrected reversals concentrated in social or team framings; effects vary substantially by model and context. Controlled current-message interventions identify two separable output-level channels in Qwen: reduced action uncertainty and less between-round drift in action probabilities. Matched history-by-message counterfactuals further show that recent partner behavior conditions how mutual-benefit versus self-prioritizing language affects policy persistence. Finally, in Prisoner's Dilemma, we identify in Qwen and Falcon a history-balanced policy-content direction in late transformer layers; projecting out this direction increases realized switching during closed-loop play, demonstrating that complete trajectories are causally sensitive to this component. Together, these findings show that cheap talk can make individual trajectories more persistent across diverse incentive structures, while revealing that the magnitude and mechanisms of stabilization are model- and history-dependent.

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03原文直达

本文内容转载自 arXiv cs.MA,如需查看原排版、配图与最新修订,请访问原始出处。

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